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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over thi s appeal by virtue of the 
Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated January 20, II 994, and Utah 
Code I nn , S 78 • 2a 3(2) (I \ .) (] 993 Ci in Sopp ) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AMD STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellee J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. submits the following 
- j iilis. o!" li-ippel ,1 ate 
review, disagrees with the issuer framed by the appellant 
A.B.P. Enterprises, Inc. dba A.B.P. Development Company ("ABP"). 
review are as follows: 
1. Whether subcontractor Clark Mechanical 
J 
negligence : t .u general contractor, ABP, where the subcontract 
between JB and Clark does not even mention ABP, and does not 
u n e q U i v o c a l ] y e X p r e S ! £ n t e n t t j i a 
indemnify any party for that party's own negligence? 
2. Whether indemnification for ABP's own negligence should 
ubcontract between JB and L'J.ark, where it. is 
not expressed I>j JB and Clark, and the Utah courts have not 
allowed such indemnificatio mplied? 
3. Whether, i n viw
 t; , 1. LLy Reform Act, the 
indemnity provisions ubcontract between Clark 
should be re- r 
1 
express an intent, not held by the parties, to indemnify ABP for 
its own negligence? 
4. Whether the interpretation of the construction contract 
urged by ABP, which interpretation would allow ABP to be 
indemnified for its own negligence as well as its sole negligence, 
would render the contract void under Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1? 
5* Whether the indemnity provisions in the contracts may be 
invalidated as violative of public policy because they were not 
bargained or negotiated for with equal bargaining power? 
6. Whether the district court's decision is sustainable on 
any proper ground? 
The applicable standard of appellate review on all of these 
issues is correction of error and this Court reviews the district 
court's decision under the same standard employed by the district 
court under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Briggs 
v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). The appellate court 
should affirm the district court decision if it is sustainable on 
any proper ground. Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 
861 (Utah 1979). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statute is determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. Construction industry—Agreements to 
indemnify. 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, 
or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or 
agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair 
or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, 
2 
appurtenance and appliance, including moving, demolition 
and excavating connected therewith, purporting to 
indemnify the promisee against liability for damages 
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to 
property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence 
of the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnitee, 
is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. 
This act will not be construed to affect or impair 
the obligations of contracts or agreements, which are in 
existence at the time the act becomes effective. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This action involved a claim for personal injuries resulting 
from an accident at a construction site in Orem, Utah. The 
plaintiff, Richard Healey, and his co-employee were laying wire 
mesh preparatory to the pouring of concrete on the second level of 
a building under construction. While in the process of their 
work, the plaintiff and his co-employee moved a section of heating 
duct that was covering an opening in the floor. The plaintiff 
fell through the opening and brought suit for his personal 
injuries against the general contractor, ABP; the mechanical 
subcontractor, Clark; and the sheet metal sub-subcontractor, JB. 
The plaintiff's complaint set forth six separate causes of 
action against the defendants. ABP filed a cross-claim against 
Clark and JB, and a third-party complaint against the plaintiff's 
employer alleging that ABP was entitled to be fully indemnified 
for any liability sustained. ABP's cross-claims and third-party 
complaint against the plaintiffs employer relied, in part, upon 
3 
a contract entered into between ABP and Clark, and a contract 
entered into between ABP and the plaintiff's employer. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below» 
ABP filed a motion for summary judgment on its cross-claim 
against Clark for indemnification on November 13, 1992. (R. 
1053.) On December 21, 1992, Clark filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment seeking dismissal of ABP's cross-claim. (R. 
2123.) By memorandum decision dated February 10, 1993, the 
district court denied ABP's motion for summary judgment and 
granted Clark's cross-motion. (R. 1720 and Exhibit C.) The 
court's order was entered on March 9, 1993, denying ABP's motion 
and granting Clark's cross-motion on the basis that the indemnity 
provisions of the contract between ABP and Clark made reference to 
liability that may arise from Clark's performance of the contract, 
but could not reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent 
of the parties that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. 
(R. 2058 and Exhibit D.) 
On November 27, 1992, ABP filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of indemnity against JB. (R. 1186.) On 
December 18, 1992, JB filed a cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment on ABP's cross-claim against JB for indemnification. (R. 
1272.) In the court's memorandum decision dated February 10, 
1993, the court denied ABP's motion for partial summary judgment. 
(R. 1720 and Exhibit C.) The court's order denying the motion was 
4 
entered on March 9, 1993. (R. 2058 and Exhibit D.) By memorandum 
decision dated June 21, 1993, the court granted JB's cross-motion 
for summary judgment against ABP on the cross-claim for 
indemnification. (R. 2143 and Exhibit E.) The court's order was 
entered on September 13, 1993 granting JB's cross-motion for 
summary judgment on ABP's cross-claim, finding that there was no 
contractual privity between ABP and JB, and that ABP had failed to 
establish that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the 
indemnity provisions of the contract between Clark and JB. The 
court further based its decision upon the ground that the 
indemnity provisions could not reasonably be interpreted as 
evidencing any intent of the parties that JB indemnify ABP for 
ABP's own negligence. (R. 2174 and Exhibit F.) 
On June 21, 1993, Clark filed a motion for judgment on its 
cross-claim for indemnification against JB. (R. 2120.) JB filed 
a cross-motion for summary judgment on the cross-claim on July 1, 
1993. (R. 2146.) By memorandum decision dated October 4, 1993, 
the court granted JB's cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 
2176 and Exhibit G.) The court's order was entered on October 18, 
1993 dismissing Clark's cross-claim against JB based on the ground 
that the indemnity provisions could not reasonably be interpreted 
as evidencing any intent of the parties that JB indemnify Clark 
for Clark's own negligence. (R. 2180 and Exhibit H.) 
The trial of this matter was scheduled to begin on March 15, 
1993. (R. 405.) The plaintiff's claims were settled just prior 
5 
to the scheduled trial. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, 
based upon the settlement of the plaintiff's claims, the 
plaintiff's claims were dismissed with prejudice by order of the 
court dated August 13f 1993. (R. 2162, 2166.) 
Statement of Facts, 
1. This action involved a claim for personal injuries 
arising out of a fall at a construction site on March 7, 1991. 
The plaintiff was employed by Gene Peterson Concrete at the time 
of the accident and was performing work on behalf of Peterson 
Concrete when the accident occurred. (R. 102.) 
2. In the process of Peterson Concrete's work, the plaintiff 
and a co-employee moved a large section of heating duct, which was 
covering a floor opening. While moving the heating duct, the 
plaintiff fell through the opening sustaining personal injuries. 
(R. 101.) 
3. Plaintiff filed his complaint against ABP, Clark and JB, 
alleging various causes of action. (R. 104.) JB denied the 
plaintiff's allegations against it. (R. 134.) ABP and Clark also 
denied the allegations. (R. 113, 236.) ABP also filed cross-
claims against Clark and JB, and a third-party complaint against 
the plaintiff's employer seeking indemnification. (R. 1255.) 
4. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged six separate causes 
of action. These causes included allegations that ABP had 
breached various independent duties as the general contractor. 
Five of the causes were alleged against all defendants. The sixth 
6 
cause of action was alleged against ABP only. As part of the 
first cause of action, a negligence claim was brought against ABP 
alleging that, as the general contractor on the construction site, 
ABP retained control over portions of the construction, that ABP 
had a duty to provide a safe place to work, and that ABP had a 
general and coordinating authority, both for the completion of the 
work and compliance with safety standards. (R. 99.) 
5. As part of the third cause of action, the plaintiff 
alleged that ABP had a non-delegable duty to furnish a safe place 
to work and that this duty was breached leading to plaintiff's 
injuries. (R. 95.) 
6. Plaintiff's sixth cause of action was asserted solely 
against ABP as the alleged owner of the premises of the 
construction site. This cause of action alleged that ABP had a 
duty to inspect and maintain its premises in a reasonably safe 
condition or to warn any business invitees of any dangerous 
conditions. (R. 92.) 
7. The other causes of action set forth in the plaintiff's 
amended complaint alleged various breaches of duty on the part of 
each of the defendants, including ABP. (R. 104-88.) 
8. ABP was the general contractor on the project and 
contracted the mechanical work to Clark. The contract between ABP 
and Clark ("ABP Agreement") contained the following provisions 
under which ABP claimed a right of indemnification against Clark: 
7 
5. LIABILITY. 
(a) General Liability: Sub-contractor shall indemnify and 
save General Contractor, its officers or agents harmless 
from and against any and all loss, damage, injury, 
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of 
persons, and all loss of or damage to property of others, 
resulting directly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's 
performance of this contract. 
(d) Employer's Liability: Sub-contractor shall perform 
the work hereunder in conformance with all applicable 
Federal and State labor laws, and shall indemnify and save 
General Contractor harmless from any and all liability, 
claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature under 
such laws arising out of the performance of this contract. 
(R. 1253.) A copy of the entire ABP Agreement is attached in the 
addendum as Exhibit A. 
9. JB was a subcontractor to Clark, providing labor and 
material for the installation of duct work for air distribution in 
the building. There was no contractual privity between ABP and 
JB. JB's contractual responsibilities were set out by a 
subcontract between Clark and JB ("Clark Agreement"). 
The provisions of the Clark Agreement relied upon by ABP in 
its brief provide: 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all 
the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor 
assumes toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall 
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save 
them harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expenses, 
costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account 
of any breach of the provisions or covenants of this 
contract. 
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the 
Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all 
regulations issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a 
term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save 
the contractor harmless from any claims or charges of any 
8 
kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully comply 
with the act and regulations and agrees to reimburse the 
contractor for any fines, damages, or expenses of any kind 
incurred by the contractor by reason of the 
subcontractor's failure to comply. 
(R. 1237.) A copy of the entire Clark Agreement is attached in 
the Addendum as Exhibit B. 
10. The trial of this case was set to begin on March 15, 
1993. (R. 405.) The trial did not occur, however, as the 
plaintiff's claims were settled prior to trial. As a result, 
there have been no findings of fact with regard to any party's 
alleged negligence or the apportionment of negligence. Based upon 
the settlement, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff's claims 
could be dismissed with prejudice, and an order of dismissal was 
entered by the court on August 13, 1993. (R. 2162, 2166.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The district court granted summary judgment 
dismissing ABP's cross-claims for indemnification against both 
Clark and JB. This Court reviews the decision of the district 
court for error, applying the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court. The decision should be affirmed, however, if it is 
sustainable on any proper ground, even if the ground was not 
relied upon by the district court. 
Point II. Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have recently reconfirmed that the strict construction 
rule applies in the State of Utah to indemnification agreements 
that are alleged to indemnify a party for that party's own 
9 
negligence. The reasons for the strict construction rule are 
sound. A party should not be able to rid itself of responsibility 
for its own negligence and place that responsibility upon another 
party by vague or general language. If responsibility for a 
party's negligence is shifted to another party, that intention and 
understanding of the parties should be clearly and unequivocally 
expressed. The presumption is against any such intention, and the 
intention should not be inferred or implied. 
Point III. ABP blanketly claims to be a third-party 
beneficiary of the Clark Agreement. It has failed to establish 
that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity 
provisions of the Clark Agreement, and continues to refer 
generally to various provisions in the Clark Agreement and ABP 
Agreement without carefully analyzing the indemnity provisions. 
There is no contractual privity between ABP and JB, and JB did not 
assume the same obligations toward ABP that Clark assumed toward 
ABP. Each agreement must be separately and carefully analyzed to 
determine whether or not an intention to indemnify ABP for its own 
negligence is clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
The comparison of the contracts at issue with the contract in 
Freund v. UP&L, demonstrates little similarity between the 
indemnification provisions. The agreement in Freund was broad-
sweeping in its scope, providing UP&L with full and complete 
indemnification from any claims of whatever nature arising out of 
the attachment of cable equipment to utility poles owned by UP&L. 
10 
The Freund agreement is not similar to the agreements here. The 
fact that some of the terms utilized in the Freund agreement also 
appear in the agreements at issue does not make the agreements 
similar. The indemnity provisions in the Clark Agreement provide 
that JB will indemnify Clark and WordPerfect Corp. against losses 
incurred on account of any breach of the Clark Agreement by JB, 
and further provide that JB will indemnify Clark for any fines 
levied and expenses incurred by reason of JB's failure to comply 
with OSHA. The indemnity provision in the ABP Agreement provides 
that Clark will indemnify ABP from losses and claims for injuries 
to persons, or loss to property of others, resulting directly or 
indirectly from Clark's performance of the contract. There is no 
expression whatsoever of any intent to indemnify ABP for its own 
negligence in either agreement. There is not even any mention of 
ABP in the Clark Agreement between Clark and JB. There is 
likewise no broad-sweeping indemnification language such as that 
found in Freund. 
ABP's reliance upon cases from other jurisdictions construing 
indemnity agreements is seriously misguided. These cases often 
apply more liberal rules of construction, and imply 
indemnification for a party's own negligence. The indemnity 
provisions in the cases cited are also too dissimilar to aid in 
interpreting the provisions in the ABP Agreement and the Clark 
Agreement. 
11 
ABP fails to cite this Court to the most recent decision by 
the Utah Supreme Court concerning an indemnity provision. In 
Ericksen v, Salt Lake City Corp., the Utah Supreme Court 
considered an indemnity provision that is much more similar to the 
provision in the ABP Agreement than any of the provisions in the 
cases cited by ABP. The provision in Ericksen provided 
indemnification for claims arising out of any act or failure to 
act by the contractor in the performance and execution of the 
agreement. The court specifically rejected the indemnitor's 
contention that the agreement was similar to the Freund contractf 
noting that Freund was much broader in its sweep. The analysis in 
Ericksen requires that ABP's claim for indemnification be 
rejected. 
Point IV. ABP contends that Utah's Liability Reform Act 
shelters it from any other party's negligence, and that the only 
purpose for the indemnity provisions is to provide indemnification 
for its own negligence. ABP therefore urges the Court to read the 
Liability Reform Act into the contracts and imply indemnification 
for ABP's own negligence. This is a new argument raised for the 
first time on appeal and should not be considered here. This 
argument would also raise new factual issues concerning whether or 
not the effect of the Liability Reform Act was considered and 
whether or not the indemnity provisions were in fact drafted after 
the effective date of the Act. 
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ABP essentially asks the Court to rewrite the contracts. It 
is a fundamental principle of contract construction that a court 
may not make a new contract for the parties or rewrite the 
contract under the guise of construction. The contracts should be 
interpreted as written. 
The principle of contract construction that, between two 
otherwise reasonable interpretations, preference may be given to 
the one that will make the agreement lawful and valid, does not 
allow for a rewriting of the contract to give it the legal effect 
desired by one party. Some language, when properly interpreted, 
may have no legal effect, or may have a legal effect other than 
what the parties in fact intended. The strict construction rule 
requires that indemnification for one's own negligence be clearly 
and unequivocally expressed. This rule of contract interpretation 
is specific to the issues here and should govern the 
interpretation. The indemnity provisions should not be construed 
as suggested by ABP simply to render them legally effective. The 
indemnity provisions at issue, in fact, have certain legal effects 
and various reasons for indemnity provisions remain under current 
law. 
Point V. The contracts do not expressly provide for the 
indemnification sought by ABP. If the indemnification language is 
read to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence, such an 
interpretation would also allow for indemnification for ABP's sole 
negligence. There is no exception in the agreement for losses 
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arising out of ABP's sole negligence• Such an interpretation of 
the indemnification provisions would be against public policy and 
would render them void and unenforceable under Utah Code Ann. § 
13-8-1. 
Point VI. It has been recognized that indemnity agreements may 
be in violation of public policy where they have resulted from a 
disparity of bargaining power, or negotiations conducted at less 
than arm's length. The contracts at issue were not drafted by JB. 
The indemnity provisions were not negotiated. Equal bargaining 
generally does not exist in the preparation of construction 
contracts. The ABP Agreement is a form agreement that has been 
utilized by ABP for six years. The indemnity provisions should be 
invalidated as they were not bargained for or negotiated for at 
arm's length. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court entered summary judgment dismissing ABP's 
cross-claim for indemnification against JB after reviewing lengthy 
memoranda filed by both parties in conjunction with cross-motions 
for summary judgment. This Court reviews the district court's 
order under the same standard employed by the district court under 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Briggs v. Holcomb, 
740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). Summary judgment is granted when 
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there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Although this Court reviews the district court decision for 
correction of error without according deference to the trial 
courts legal conclusions, under standards of appellate review, 
this Court should affirm the district court if its decision is 
sustainable on any proper ground. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that: 
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the trial 
court if we can do so on any proper ground even if the 
court below assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling. 
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). See 
also Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1988). This rule of appellate review applies even if the proper 
ground was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and 
even if the proper ground is not urged on appeal. Goodsel v. 
Department of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
1974). 
POINT II 
THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE APPLIES IN INTERPRETING ANY 
AGREEMENT THAT IS ALLEGED TO INDEMNIFY A PARTY FOR THAT 
PARTY'S OWN NEGLIGENCE. THIS RULE HAS NOT BEEN, AND 
SHOULD NOT BE, RELAXED. 
In seeking indemnification for its own negligence, ABP urges 
this Court to relax the rule of strict construction in accordance 
with an alleged growing trend to relax the rule. ABP contends 
that the Utah Supreme Court took the first step toward relaxing 
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the strict construction rule in Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 
793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). While both this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have acknowledged that some states have relaxed the 
strict construction rule, however, the rule has been upheld and 
reconfirmed in its application to indemnity provisions that are 
alleged to provide indemnification for one's own negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Freund reconfirmed the application 
of the strict construction rule in the State of Utah, citing a 
long line of cases: 
In a long line of cases spanning more than fifty years, 
we have repeatedly held that an indemnity agreement 
which purports to make a party respond for the 
negligence of another should be strictly construed. 
[Citations omitted.] A party is contractually obligated 
to assume ultimate financial responsibility for the 
negligence of another only when that intention is 
"clearly and unequivocally expressed." 
Id. at 370 (emphasis added). 
This Court has also acknowledged the applicability of the 
strict construction rule in recent cases. See Pickhover v. 
Smith/s Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989) and Gordon 
v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Pickhover, this Court reviewed some of the reasons for the 
strict construction rule as follows: 
The strict construction rule seems to have arisen 
primarily to appease the concern that one who is not 
financially responsible for the consequences of his or 
her own negligence will be less careful in his or her 
behavior toward others. See e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d at 913. Under the strict 
construction rule, a party is contractually obligated to 
assume ultimate financial responsibility for the 
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negligence of another "only when that intention is 
clearly and unequivocally expressed." Id. at 914. "But 
the presumption is against any such intention, and it is 
not achieved by inference or implication from general 
language . . .." Id. 
Pickhover, at 667 (emphasis added). 
In Gordon, this Court again reconfirmed the application of 
the rule of strict construction and stated that "under this rule, 
there is a presumption against an intent to indemnify unless 'that 
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed.'" Gordon. at 
494. Gordon also noted that when construing indemnification 
clauses, no intention to confer third-party beneficiary rights 
will be inferred from the indemnity language alone. Id. 
ABP's argument that the rule of strict construction should be 
relaxed or that the rule has already been relaxed is contrary to 
recent and repeated pronouncements by both this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court. The reasons for the strict construction rule are 
sound. Contrary to ABP's argument, the rule serves legitimate 
purposes even today. The fact that liability insurance is 
commonplace in modern transactions does not undercut the reasons 
for the rule. A party should not be able to effectively pass 
responsibility for its own negligence to another party by vague or 
general language. If an agreement places responsibility for one 
party's negligence upon another party, such shifted responsibility 
should be ultimately clear and unequivocal. There should be no 
room for mistake or misunderstanding on the part of the purported 
indemnitor that it is assuming responsibility for the indemnitee's 
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negligence. Without a clear and unequivocal expression of such an 
intent and understanding, there is a risk of confusion, and the 
danger that the purported indemnitor does not understand its 
responsibilities. If a party seeks to rid itself of 
responsibility for its own negligence by placing that 
responsibility upon another party, such an arrangement must occur 
by a clear meeting of the minds. The reasons for the strict 
construction rule remain sound. One should be responsible for his 
or her own negligence unless that responsibility has been clearly 
and unequivocally shifted. 
ABP's argument that Utah's Comparative Fault Law eliminates 
the need for the strict construction rule is without merit. The 
foregoing reasons apply equally under the current law. 
Furthermore, contrary to ABP's assertion, indemnity agreements can 
have purposes other than seeking indemnification for one's own 
negligence. As an example, indemnity agreements may be used to 
obtain indemnification for contractual defaults of the indemnitor 
for which the indemnitee may be obligated to respond. This will 
be discussed under Point IV, infra. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL EXPRESSION OF INTENT 
ON THE PART OF JB TO INDEMNIFY ABP FOR ABP'S OWN 
NEGLIGENCE. 
In an attempt to find clear and unequivocal language 
indemnifying ABP for its own negligence, ABP asserts that the 
indemnification language in this case is very similar to the 
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language found in Freund and that Freund mandates indemnity for 
ABP's own negligence. ABP's attempted comparison of the contract 
in Freund with the contracts here demonstrates the absurdity of 
its position. The court in Freund held that the indemnity 
provisions at issue, when analyzed as a whole, contained broad 
sweeping indemnification language which expressed a clear and 
unequivocal intent to indemnify UP&L for its own negligence. It 
is easily demonstrated that the agreements here are not similar to 
the agreement in Freund. 
A. The Indemnity Provisions Must Be Carefully And Strictly 
Construed. Indemnification For A Party's Own Negligence 
Should Not Be Implied And Third-Party Beneficiary Rights 
Should Not Be Implied. 
An analysis of the indemnity provisions must begin with a 
careful reading of the indemnity provisions themselves. Not all 
of the indemnity provisions referenced by ABP in this matter apply 
to ABP's claim against JB. There are two separate contracts at 
issue. One contract is between ABP and Clark (the ABP Agreement), 
and the other contract is between Clark and JB (the Clark 
Agreement). ABP is now critical of the district court's ruling 
that ABP had failed to establish that it was an intended third-
party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of the Clark 
Agreement. In granting JB's cross-motion for summary judgment 
against ABP, the court found and ruled as follows: 
There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. 
Sheet Metal, Inc., and ABP has failed to establish that 
it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the 
indemnity provisions of the contract between Clark 
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Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. 
The Court further finds that the indemnity provisions 
cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any 
intent of the parties that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. 
indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
See Order and Judgment, dated 9/13/93. (R. 2174 and Exhibit F.) 
ABP argues that the district court7s order is not in harmony 
with Utah law regarding third-party beneficiary rights. What ABP 
fails to recognize is that the district court found that ABP had 
failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of the 
indemnity provisions of the subcontract agreement between JB and 
Clark. In the memoranda filed with the district court by ABP, ABP 
confused the indemnity provisions existing in the ABP agreement 
and the Clark Agreement and based its claim against JB upon the 
assertion that JB assumed the same obligations toward ABP that 
Clark assumed toward ABP. (See ABP's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Issue of Indemnity, R. 1182; and Reply Memorandum of ABP 
Enterprises, Inc. in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against JB Sheet Metal, Inc. and in 
Opposition to JB Sheet Metal's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
R. 1528.) The amended cross-claim filed by ABP against JB was 
based upon the allegation that JB owed the same duties to ABP as 
were owed by Clark. (R. 1250.) ABP failed to carefully read the 
indemnity provisions, and in fact confused the provisions in both 
its cross-claim and its memoranda to the court in attempting to 
obtain indemnification against JB, and somehow assumed that it was 
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a third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions in the Clark 
Agreement. 
There is no contractual privity between ABP and JB. No 
intention to confer third-party beneficiary rights upon ABP should 
be inferred from the indemnity language in the Clark Agreement. 
Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, 820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App. 
1991). There is a presumption against any intent on the part of 
JB to indemnify ABP unless that intention is clearly and 
unequivocally expressed. Thus, there must be a clear and 
unequivocal expression in the Clark Agreement that JB will 
indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. No such intention can be 
found in the agreement. 
The pertinent provisions of the Clark Agreement provide as 
follows: 
The Subcontractor [JB] assumes toward the 
Contractor [Clark] all the obligations and 
responsibilities that the Contractor assumes toward the 
Owner [WordPerfect Corp.]. The Subcontractor shall 
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save 
them harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expenses, 
costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on 
account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of 
this contract. 
Subcontractor agrees to fully comply with the 
Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and any and all 
regulations issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as 
a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and 
save the contractor harmless from any claims or charges 
of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully 
comply with the act and regulations and agrees to 
reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or 
expenses of any kind incurred by the contractor by 
reason of the subcontractor's failure to comply. 
(Brackets added.) 
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It must first be noted that while JB assumes toward Clark all 
the obligations and responsibilities that Clark assumes toward 
WordPerfect Corp., there is nothing in the contract indicating 
that JB assumes those obligations toward either WordPerfect Corp. 
or ABP. ABP has confused provisions from the two agreements and 
has failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of 
the Clark Agreement. The district court's ruling on this point 
was correct. 
Most importantly, with regard to the indemnification provided 
by the Clark Agreement, the provision indicates only that JB shall 
indemnify Clark and the owner [WordPerfect Corp.] against any loss 
incurred or suffered on account of any breach by JB of the 
provisions or covenants of the contract between Clark and JB. 
This is a very limited indemnification and there is certainly no 
clear and unequivocal expression of an intent to indemnify ABP for 
anything, let alone for ABP's own negligence. Even if the 
provision is very liberally construed, which would be 
inappropriate under the strict construction rule or under other 
standards of contract construction, there is no expression 
whatsoever of any intent to indemnify ABP for its own negligence. 
The district court's decision was also correct on this point. 
There is likewise no expression of intent to indemnify ABP 
for its own negligence in the second paragraph quoted above from 
the Clark Agreement. In the second paragraph, JB agrees to fully 
comply with the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 and to 
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keep and save Clark harmless from any claims or charges by reason 
of JB failing to fully comply with the Act and agrees to reimburse 
Clark for any fines, damages or expenses of any kind incurred by 
Clark by reason of JB's own failure to comply. This indicates 
that any fines levied or other expenses incurred by Clark because 
of an OSHA violation by JB will be paid by JB although the fine 
may be levied against Clark. There is certainly no expression in 
this provision of an intent to indemnify ABP for ABP's own 
negligence. Furthermore, there were no fines levied by OSHA and 
there was no breach of this provision of the contract. 
It should also be noted that any liability that could have 
been found against ABP in this matter would necessarily be based 
upon ABP's own negligence, not upon JB's negligence or violation 
of OSHA regulations. Further, negligence attributed to ABP could 
not be based upon a violation of OSHA regulations, as both 
congress and the Utah State legislature have expressly stated that 
the OSHA Act and regulations do not provide a basis for any civil 
liability. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4); and Utah Code Ann. § 35-9-
20(2). OSHA regulations were not intended to affect common law 
rights and liabilities and can never provide a basis for civil 
liability. See Knapstad v. Smiths Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1989). 
As set forth above, the only reasonable interpretation of the 
indemnity provision in the Clark Agreement, to which JB is a 
party, is that JB agrees to indemnify Clark and WordPerfect Corp. 
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against losses incurred on account of any breach by JB of the 
provisions or covenants of the contract between JB and Clark. It 
does not purport to indemnify any party for that party's own 
negligence, and certainly does not contain broad and all-
encompassing language such as that in Freund. 
B. The Indemnity Provisions In Freund v. UP&L Were Detailed 
And Broad-Sweeping In Their Scope. The Indemnity 
Provisions In This Action Are Not "Similar" And Must Be 
Independently And Strictly Construed. 
A comparison of the indemnity provisions at issue with the 
indemnity provisions found in Freund demonstrates the lack of 
support for ABP's position. The indemnification provision in 
Freund was extremely broad and expressly provided for 
indemnification from any and all liability arising out of the 
attachment of the cable equipment to utility poles owned by UP&L. 
In Freund, the plaintiff was injured when he came into 
contact with a power line as he was splicing amplifiers into a 
television cable previously hung by a cable company on utility 
poles owned by UP&L. The plaintiff brought suit against the cable 
company and UP&L. UP&L sought indemnification against the cable 
company who was initially permitted to attach the cables to the 
utility poles. In allowing the cable company to attach the cables 
to the utility poles, an indemnification agreement was entered 
into requiring the cable company to indemnify UP&L from any and 
all liability. The Utah Supreme Court carefully analyzed, line by 
line, the detailed indemnification agreement. The court found 
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that the first sentence of the provision provided for indemnity 
from "any and all" liability arising out of the attachment of 
cable equipment to the utility poles. The agreement specifically 
provided that: 
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and save 
harmless Licensor [UP & L] from and against any and all 
claims, demands, causes of action, costs or other 
liabilities . . . which may arise out of or be connected 
with the erection, maintenance, presence, use or removal 
of Licensee/s equipment . . . . 
Id. at 371 (emphasis original). The court then stated: 
It is true that this sentence does not specifically 
mention the effect of any negligence on the part of the 
licensor. However, the broad sweep of the language 
employed by the parties clearly covers those instances 
in which the licensor may be negligent. The parties 
covered "any and all claims, demands, causes of action, 
costs or other liabilities." The word "liabilities" is 
particularly significant since it covers those instances 
where the licensor is legally liable for damages, 
including those where liability arises because of the 
licensor's negligence. 
Id. 
The Freund court then noted that the third sentence of the 
indemnification provision stated that the licensee shall provide 
a legal defense to "any and all" suits brought by third parties 
and shall "pay and satisfy" any such suit. Id. Finally, the 
court noted that the indemnification provision ended with a 
summary statement of what the parties intended to cover in the 
previous three sentences concerning indemnification: 
This indemnification agreement by Licensee in favor of 
Licensor, shall provide Licensor with full and complete 
indemnification, including defense of any suits, actions 
or other legal proceedings resulting from any claims for 
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damages • • • of whatever nature which shall be made or 
assessed against Licensor in furnishing such poles under 
the terms of this agreement or for any other thing done 
or omitted in conjunction with Licensor's dealings with 
Licensee. 
Id. (Emphasis original.) The court concluded that the 
indemnification provision, as a whole, expressed a clear and 
unequivocal intent by the parties that the licensee would 
indemnify the licensor from any and all liabilities, including 
liability that arises because of the licensor's negligence. 
Without question, the indemnity provision in Freund expressed 
a clear and unequivocal intent to indemnify UP&L for its own 
negligence. It provided that the indemnitor would provide a legal 
defense to any and all suits brought by third parties and would 
pay and satisfy any such suit. It further provided in a summary 
statement that the indemnitor would provide the indemnitee with 
full and complete indemnification, including defense of any suitsf 
actions or other legal proceedings resulting from any claims for 
damages to property and injury or death to persons and shall apply 
to all claims, demands, suits, and judgments of whatever nature. 
As characterized by the Utah Supreme Court, this language was 
broad-sweeping and provided indemnification for the indemnitee's 
own negligence. 
In stark contrast to the provisions in Freund, the 
indemnification provisions found in the Clark Agreement do not 
even remotely satisfy the standards set forth by the Utah courts 
before a party may be indemnified for its own negligence. The 
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first provision relied upon by ABP provides simply that JB will 
indemnify Clark and "the Owner," WordPerfect Corp., against loss 
incurred on account of any breach of the Clark Agreement by JB. 
The owner is WordPerfect Corp., not ABP. The second provision 
relates to fines levied and expenses incurred by reason of failure 
of JB to comply with OSHA. The district court was correct in 
ruling that the provisions could not reasonably be interpreted as 
evidencing any intent of the parties that JB indemnify ABP for 
ABP's own negligence. 
The indemnity provisions in the ABP Agreement between ABP and 
Clark also differ markedly from the provisions in Freund. The 
first provision at issue in the ABP Agreement provides that Clark 
will indemnify ABP from loss, liability and claims for injuries to 
persons, loss or damage to property of others, "resulting directly 
or indirectly from [Clark's] performance of this contract," not 
ABP's own conduct. (Brackets added.) The second provision quoted 
by ABP deals with Clark's obligation to perform its own work in 
compliance with federal and state labor laws. These cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence. (It must be 
noted that JB is not a party to the ABP Agreement and JB has no 
obligation to ABP under that agreement.) 
Neither the provisions in the Clark Agreement nor the 
provisions in the ABP Agreement bear any close similarity to the 
provisions in Freund. The provisions must be independently and 
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strictly construed. They do not provide broad-sweeping 
indemnification language which clearly and unequivocally shifts 
the burden of ABP's negligence upon either Clark or JB. The 
district courts decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
C. Cases From Other Jurisdictions Construing Indemnity 
Agreements Often Apply Different Rules Of Construction 
And Should Be Rejected. The Provisions Analyzed Are 
Dissimilar And Do Not Aid In Interpreting The Provisions 
Here. 
The analysis followed by other jurisdictions may differ from 
that used by the Utah courts and should therefore be rejected. 
Most importantly, any indemnity provision must be carefully and 
strictly construed on its own. Interpretations of other 
provisions by other courts is of little or no value. The cases 
cited by ABP from other jurisdictions demonstrate the problem. 
The court in Fischbach-Natkin v. Power Process Piping, 403 
N.W.2d 569 (Mich. App. 1987) found that the indemnity provision at 
issue was broad and clear, encompassing all liability for 
injuries, after examining the indemnity language, surrounding 
circumstances, and the purpose sought to be accomplished by the 
parties. The court did not utilize the rule of construction that 
is used by the Utah courts, and expressly stated that the rule 
requiring a clear and unequivocal expression in the contract that 
one party indemnify another party for the indemnitee's own 
negligence was inapplicable under Michigan law. Id. at 571. 
The analysis by the court in Bosse v. Litton Unit Handling 
Systems, Etc., 646 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1981) is likewise of little 
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value* The court in Bosse read the agreement to provide 
indemnification whenever the indemnitor was found to be at fault. 
Because the jury found the indemnitor to be negligent, the court 
reasoned that the plaintiff's injury was sustained by reason of an 
act or omission of the indemnitor arising out of the work 
performed under the agreement. The court's analysis is not 
helpful here. The indemnity provision at issue is too dissimilar 
to be compared and the court's analysis is specific to the 
particular indemnity provision. Furthermore, the court rejected 
the strict construction rule and construed the agreement like any 
other contract. Id. at 693. The same problems exist in 
Kirkpatrick & Associates v. Wickes Corp., 280 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. 
App. 1981). The indemnity provision there is not similar to the 
provisions in either the Clark Agreement or the ABP Agreement, and 
the court did not strictly construe the provision. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Public Service Co. v. United 
Cable, 829 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 1992), carefully analyzed the 
indemnity provision at issue to find that an intent to indemnify 
the indemnitee for its own negligence was clearly and 
unequivocally expressed. The case is very similar to Freund v. 
UP&L. The indemnity agreement provided that the licensee would 
indemnify the electric company from all claims and liabilities in 
any way arising out of the licensee's use of the electric 
company's poles or facilities. Id. at 1282. There is little 
similarity to the provisions in this matter. 
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In summary, an analysis of the construction placed by other 
courts upon indemnification provisions is of little or no value in 
construing the indemnity provisions at issue here. First of allf 
other jurisdictions may apply different rules of construction. 
Secondly, the provisions are not sufficiently similar for rational 
comparison and the analyses made by the courts are specific to the 
particular provisions. Finally, any indemnity provision must 
stand on its own and evidence a clear and unequivocal intent that 
the indemnitee be indemnified for its own negligence. 
D. The Indemnity Provision In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City 
Corp. Is Most Similar To The Indemnity Provisions Here. 
The Court's Analysis In Ericksen Mandates Dismissal Of 
ABP's Claim For Indemnification. 
If ABP wishes to compare other indemnity provisions and the 
analyses made by courts of those provisions, a comparison should 
have been made with the provision found in Ericksen v. Salt Lake 
City Corp. , 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). This appears to be the most 
recent analysis by the Utah Supreme Court of an indemnity 
provision where the indemnitee sought indemnification for its own 
negligence. Interestinglyf this case was omitted from ABP's list 
of comparison cases. As Ericksen is a Utah case, and addresses 
the purported indemnitee's reliance upon Freund v. Utah Power & 
Light, the case warrants some attention. Moreover, the indemnity 
provision at issue in Ericksen, unlike those in the cases recited 
by ABP, is similar to the indemnity provisions here. The Ericksen 
provision read as follows: 
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The Contractor agrees to at all times protect, 
indemnify, save harmless and defend the Cityf its agents 
and employees from any and all claims, demands, 
judgments, expenses, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, and all other damages of every kind and nature 
made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf of any person 
or persons whomsoever, including the parties hereto and 
their employees, which may arise out of any act or 
failure to act, work or other activity related in any 
way to the project, by the said Contractor. its agents, 
subcontractors, materialmen or employees in the 
performance and execution of this Agreement. 
Ericksen, at 998 (emphasis added). 
The court found the provision to be clear and that it 
entitled the City to indemnification only when the claim arises 
out of an act of the contractor or its agents, subcontractors, 
materialmen, or employees in the performance and execution of the 
agreement. Id. The court rejected the City's claim for 
indemnification for its own negligence, noting specifically that 
the city's reliance on Freund v. Utah Power & Light was misplaced, 
and that the contract of indemnity in Freund was much broader in 
its sweep than that found in the Ericksen case. Id. 
Like the City's contention in Ericksen. ABP's reliance on 
Freund, and its comparison of the Freund agreement to the 
indemnity provisions in this case is misplaced. ABP's reliance 
upon the other cases cited from other jurisdictions is even 
further misguided. The indemnity provisions at issue here must 
stand on their own and are easily construed under the strict 
construction rule. The pertinent provision in the ABP Agreement 
provides that Clark will indemnify ABP for particular losses 
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"resulting directly or indirectly from [Clark's] performance of 
this contract." The provision in the Clark Agreement provides 
that JB will indemnify Clark or the owner, WordPerfect Corp., 
against any loss incurred on account of any breach by JB of the 
provisions of that contract* The effect of the provisions is 
similar to the effect of the provision in Ericksen. The 
provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted to provide 
indemnification for ABP's own negligence. 
POINT IV 
ABP'S ATTEMPT TO REWRITE ITS CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN CLARK AND JB IN LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
LAW SHOULD BE REJECTED. ABP SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO 
RAISE THIS ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND THIS 
COURT SHOULD NOT REWRITE THE CONTRACT TO THE BENEFIT OF 
ABP AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF EITHER CLARK OR JB. 
A. ABP's Argument That Utah's Liability Reform Act 
Should Be Read Into The Indemnity Provisions Has 
Been Raised For The First Time On Appeal And 
Should Not Be Considered By This Court. 
The essence of ABP's argument on appeal is that the indemnity 
provisions should be rewritten by this Court to provide the 
meaning urged by ABP in light of and under the circumstances of 
the Liability Reform Act. ABP asserts that since Utah law now 
shelters ABP from any other party's negligence, the only purpose 
for the indemnity provisions is to provide indemnification for 
ABP,s own negligence. While this argument is faulty for many 
reasons, it should not be considered on appeal for the first time. 
It was not raised below in any of the memoranda filed by ABP. It 
is fundamental that the trial court should have the first 
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opportunity to address issues later raised on appeal, and that the 
appellate court should decline to consider arguments raised for 
the first time at the appellate level. Smith v. Iversen, 848 P.2d 
677 (Utah 1993). One exception to this rule of appellate review 
is that the appellate court may affirm trial court decisions on 
any proper ground, even though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling. Thus, an argument made for the first time 
on appeal will be considered if it will result in affirmance, but 
will not be considered if it will result in reversal. See State 
v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991). 
One reason for this rule has been stated by the Utah Supreme 
Court as follows: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he can 
not thereafter change to some different theory and thus 
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation. 
Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), 
quoting from Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 
470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). 
It should be noted that, whether the point raised by ABP is 
characterized as a new argument or a new issue, consideration of 
the point for the first time on appeal should be rejected. The 
Utah Supreme Court has declined to honor such a distinction, 
noting that the concern is whether an argument was addressed in 
the first instance to the trial court. If it was not, 
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consideration at the appellate level is precluded* See, Ong 
International (USA) v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455, n.31 
(Utah 1993) . 
ABP's argument concerning the effect of Utah's amendment to 
the Comparative Negligence Law in 1986 should not be considered 
here. It was not raised below and is an entirely new issue or 
argument. Indeed, the argument raises factual issues concerning 
whether or not the parties considered the effect of the Liability 
Reform Act and whether or not the particular form contracts 
utilized by ABP and Clark had in fact been amended at or near the 
time of the Liability Reform Act or thereafter to account for the 
change in the law. This presents yet another reason why this 
Court should refuse to consider this new issue. The injection of 
new issues of fact into the appeal is improper and is reason to 
reject consideration of the issue. See Zions First Nat. Bank v. 
National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). On this 
point, it should be noted that the ABP Agreement, although signed 
by ABP and Clark in 1990, was the same form that had been utilized 
by ABP on all of its projects for six years. (See depo of Stephen 
Clark, p.53, Exhibit I.) The provision was therefore drafted 
prior to the Liability Reform Act. 
Under sound rules of appellate review, ABP's new argument 
should not be considered. 
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B. The Court Should Not Rewrite The Indemnity 
Provisions To Give Them The Legal Effect Desired 
By ABP. 
ABP asks this Court to construe the indemnity provisions to 
give them the legal effect that ABP now desires. To bolster its 
argument, ABP suggests that the indemnity provisions would be 
rendered meaningless unless the provisions are read to clearly and 
unequivocally indemnify ABP for its own negligence* In effect, 
ABP urges the Court to rewrite the indemnity provisions. It is 
not the function of the courts, however, to rewrite unambiguous 
contracts, and the Court should not do so under the guise of 
construction. Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co. 603 P.2d 803, 
805 (Utah 1979). See also Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica, 
Inc. , 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). As recognized by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Fourth National Bank v. Mobile Oil Corp., 582 
P.2d 236 (Kan. 1978), the basic legal principles on this point are 
well-expressed in 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, § 242 (1964) pp. 627-
629, as follows: 
It is a fundamental principle that a court may not make 
a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract 
under the guise of construction. In other words, the 
interpretation or construction of a contract does not 
include its modification or the creation of a new or 
different one. It must be construed and enforced 
according to the terms employed, and a court has no 
right to interpret the agreement as meaning something 
different from what the parties intended as expressed by 
the language they saw fit to employ. A court is not at 
liberty to revise, modify, or distort an agreement while 
professing to construe it, and has no right to make a 
different contract from that actually entered into by 
the parties. Courts cannot make for the parties better 
or more equitable agreements than they themselves have 
35 
been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because 
they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the 
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and 
to the detriment of the other, or, by construction, 
relieve one of the parties from terms which he 
voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which 
he did not. 
Fourth National Bank, at 241. 
The indemnity provisions at issue simply do not provide for 
indemnification for ABP's own negligence. The "interpretation" of 
the provisions in the manner suggested by ABP would result in a 
rewriting of the provisions in violation of the above-stated 
rules. This Court should interpret the provisions as written. 
They do not clearly and unequivocally express an intent to 
indemnify ABP for its own negligence. 
C. The Indemnity Provisions Should Not Be Construed 
In A Manner Simply To Render Them Legally 
Effective. Where They Do Not Clearly And 
Unequivocally Express An Intention To Indemnify 
ABP For Its Own Negligence. 
ABP argues that the ABP agreement should not be interpreted 
in a way that renders it void. It cites this Court to the 
principle that in construing a contract, a construction giving an 
instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be 
adopted where reasonable, and between two possible constructions 
that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract. Stangl 
v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah 1976). This principle of 
contract construction does not allow the Court to construe the 
indemnity provisions in the manner urged by ABP simply to give the 
provisions legal effect. The strict construction rule requires 
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that a party cannot be contractually indemnified for its own 
negligence unless that contractual intent is clearly and 
unequivocally expressed• The rule of contract construction stated 
in Stangl simply provides that, as between two otherwise 
reasonable interpretations, preference may be given to the one 
that will make the agreement lawful and valid. The principle does 
not allow for a rewriting of the contract to give it legal effect. 
Indeed, parties may not always intend that all provisions of an 
agreement have legal effect. One party may intend that a 
particular provision have a certain legal effect and another party 
may intend that the provision have a different effect or no effect 
at all. Further, the parties may be wholly ignorant of the law 
and of the legal effects that an agreement will produce. This was 
recognized by Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts as 
follows: 
As between two otherwise reasonable 
interpretations, preference may be given to the one that 
will make the agreement lawful and valid. It may be 
true that parties usually intend to act lawfully and to 
produce a legal effect by their agreement; but at times 
they may consciously intend otherwise, and at other 
times they be wholly ignorant of the law and of the 
legal effects that an agreement will produce. Observe 
further that interpretation and the determination of 
legal effect are quite different processes. 
n. b. Some language, when properly interpreted, may have 
no legal effect, or a legal effect other than the 
parties in fact intended. See Restatement, Contracts § 
226, Comment c. 
Corbin on Contracts, (One Vol. Ed.) §§ 545-554, p. 521 (1952). 
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ABP also cites this Court to the premise that a contract 
implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered 
and contends that if the Liability Reform Act is read into the 
agreements, they must provide indemnification for ABP's own 
negligence* If the principle were so broad, contractual 
provisions would be rewritten by the courts regardless of the 
parties' intentions and regardless of whether or not the parties 
had a meeting of the minds. As Professor Williston stated, the 
statement of the premise is too broad to be accepted without 
qualification. To assume, first, that everybody knows the law, 
and, second, that everybody thereupon makes his contract and 
adopts its provisions as terms of the agreement, is to pile a 
fiction upon a fiction. 4 S. Williston, Williston on Contracts. 
§ 615, p. 605 (3d ed. 1961). The stated premise is not so broad 
as to imply indemnification for another party's negligence where 
the contract does not so provide. 
Contrary to ABP's contentions, neither Utah law nor general 
rules of contract construction require an interpretation that 
would give particular provisions of a contract legal effect. Such 
a stretch of contract interpretation principles would give rise to 
a complete rewriting of the contract. ABP essentially urges this 
Court to imply indemnification for its own negligence. This flies 
in the face of the strict construction rule and the reasons for 
the rule. Further, as will be demonstrated herein, in Point V, 
infra, the legislature of the State of Utah has declared that 
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certain indemnification provisions in construction contracts are 
indeed void, and have no legal effect. 
D. The Indemnity Provisions Are Not Meaningless As 
Drafted, 
ABP contends that Utah law now shelters ABP from any other 
party's negligence, and that the indemnity clauses would be 
meaningless unless they are read to provide indemnification for 
ABP's own negligence. ABP also cites this Court to Bosse and 
Kirkpatrick for the proposition that the only reason for an 
indemnity clause under current law is to protect the general 
contractor from the consequences of its own negligence. This 
contention is simply false, and ignores other purposes for the 
provisions. For example, the indemnification provision in the 
Clark Agreement with JB provides for obligations and 
responsibility for breach of contract as opposed to tort. The 
Clark Agreement provides that "the subcontractor shall indemnify 
the contractor and the owner against, and save them harmless from, 
any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorney's fees 
incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions or 
covenants of this contract." (Emphasis added.) ABP's argument 
and the Bosse court's reasoning ignore this most obvious purpose 
for the provision. If JB breached its contract in some manner by 
failing to perform the work, or by improperly performing under the 
contract, Clark could be held responsible to the owner and perhaps 
others for such a failure on the part of JB to complete its 
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contract* The most obvious purpose of this indemnity provision is 
to provide that JB will indeinnify Clark and the owner against such 
loss. To argue that the provision is meaningless unless it is 
read to provide ABP or Clark with indemnification for their own 
negligence in tort is to ignore the clear language of the 
agreement and the obvious legal effect thereof. 
Another obvious purpose for the indemnity clauses is to 
provide for expenses, costs, fines, etc., if the parties are 
administratively sanctioned. This purpose is equally clear from 
the language of the agreement, and again does not relate to tort. 
The other provision of the Clark Agreement at issue provides that 
the subcontractor, JB, agrees to comply with the Occupational 
Safety & Health Act of 1970, and further agrees to keep and save 
the contractor, Clark, harmless from any claims or charges of any 
kind by reason of the subcontractor, JB, failing to comply with 
the Act. JB agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines, 
damages, or expenses incurred by reason of the failure to comply. 
The obvious purpose of this provision is to assure that JB will 
pay any fines that are levied or other expenses incurred by reason 
of OSHA violations by JB. The provision cannot relate to tort 
because failure to comply with OSHA regulations is not a basis for 
tort damages. (See the argument under Point III.A. above.) The 
provision is not meaningless and does not need to be redrafted to 
give it meaning. Indemnification for torts does not need to be 
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implied or otherwise supplied contrary to the meeting of the minds 
of the parties* 
There are other possible reasons for the indemnity provisions 
in the two contracts.1 JB does not attempt to set forth all 
possible reasons for such indemnity provisions and establish the 
legal effect, but submits that where any such indemnification is 
claimed, the provision must be analyzed in that context to 
determine if indemnification is provided for. As noted, the 
failure of a subcontractor to complete its work or to properly 
perform its work may result in liability to the upstream parties, 
which may give rise to indemnification under the provisions at 
issue. Under any circumstance, indemnity provisions must be 
carefully analyzed. Indemnification for one/s own negligence is 
not the only possible purpose for such an agreement. 
The indemnity provisions at issue are not meaningless, but 
can apply to breaches of contract and administrative sanctions. 
They do not need to be redrafted as urged by ABP to give them 
meaning and life. They should be construed as drafted. They do 
*It should be noted that the contracts at issue may in fact 
have been drafted with joint and several liability in mind, with 
the design to shield the indemnitee from liability for the 
negligent acts of others. Such a purpose was recognized in Brown 
v. Boyer-Washinqton Blvd. Assocs., 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993). ABP 
attempts to distinguish this case based upon the fact that the 
contracts here were entered into after the Liability Reform Act. 
The contracts were nevertheless drafted much earlier and the 
indemnity provisions may have been formulated with joint and 
several liability in mind. The ABP Agreement is on the same form 
used by ABP on all the projects at the site for six years. (See 
depo of Stephen Clark, p. 53, Exhibit I.) 
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not, even by a liberal interpretation, provide that either Clark 
or JB should indemnify ABP for its own negligence. 
POINT V 
ABP'S INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS 
REQUIRES AN INTERPRETATION THAT IS AGAINST PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 13-8-1. 
Section 13-8-1 of the Utah Code provides that an agreement in 
a contract related to construction purporting to indemnify the 
promisee against liability for bodily injury or property damage 
caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee is 
against public policy and is void and unenforceable. The 
legislature has thus declared that certain indemnity provisions 
are indeed void and have no legal effect. In such cases, the 
provisions should not be rewritten by the courts. They are simply 
declared void and unenforceable. 
ABP seeks indemnification for its own negligence, and urges 
an interpretation of the ABP Agreement and the Clark Agreement 
that would provide for such indemnification.2 There is no 
reference to ABP's own negligence or fault in the pertinent 
provisions of the contract, and there is no broad sweeping 
2ABP argues that it was not ABP's sole negligence that 
caused the plaintiff's injuries. It references the underlying 
pleadings where the plaintiff's complaint alleges negligence 
against ABP, JB and Clark. It further references pleadings filed 
by JB and Clark where allegations were made that the accident was 
caused in part by the plaintiff's employer and co-employees. It 
must be noted that the references made by ABP are to allegations 
only. There was no finding made by the trial court apportioning 
negligence. 
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language providing for all-inclusive indemnification as was found 
in Freund. 
ABP contends that under Utah's current comparative negligence 
law it can only be held responsible for its own negligence• It 
therefore follows that the indemnification sought by ABP in this 
matter is indemnification for its sole negligence* An 
indemnification provision providing for such would be void under 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1• ABP suggests, on the one hand, that it 
can only be held responsible for its own negligence, while on the 
other hand, contends that it is seeking indemnification for the 
concurrent negligence of ABP and Clark, not for ABP's sole 
negligence* If ABP can only be held responsible for its own 
negligence, then any indemnification sought must be for its sole 
negligence and the indemnity provision violates Section 13-8-1. 
More significantly, it is the interpretation of the indemnity 
provisions urged by ABP that renders the provisions void under 
Section 13-8-1. The contracts do not expressly provide for the 
indemnification urged by ABP. If the general language of the 
indemnity provisions is read to provide for such, they fail to 
limit that obligation to situations where ABP is not the sole 
responsible party. Such an all-encompassing indemnification 
provision is against public policy and void. In other words, to 
read the indemnification provisions so broadly would mean that ABP 
would be indemnified for not only its own negligence, but also its 
sole negligence. This Court addressed this issue under different 
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circumstances in Jacobsen Const, v. Blaine Const., 863 P.2d 1329 
(Utah App. 1993). ABP attempts to distinguish Jacobsen because 
the agreement there limited the indemnification by excluding 
situations where the indemnitee was actively negligent. ABP 
argues that because the ABP Agreement does not make a distinction 
between active and passive negligence, the holding does not apply. 
This argument is faulty. The agreements in this matter are even 
further removed from being valid. The provisions here do not make 
any exclusion. If they are read to indemnify ABP for its 
negligence, there is no limitation and the broad reading would 
include indemnification for sole negligence. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah also had an 
opportunity to address this issue in Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 
663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987). The following analysis by the 
court is instructive: 
In addition, paragraph eight fails to state that 
Stockmar [the indemnitor] will not indemnify Kennecott 
[the indemnitee] if Kennecott is the sole cause of an 
injury or damage. Thus, if the general language is read 
to provide indemnification for Kennecott's own 
negligence, it fails to limit that obligation to 
situations where Kennecott is not the sole responsible 
party. In those circumstances, such an all encompassing 
indemnification provision is "against public policy and 
is void and unenforceable." Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 
(1986); cf. Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 
272, 278 (D. Utah 1985) (observing that the three 
reported cases which apply Utah law and uphold an 
indemnitor's obligation to cover for losses caused by 
the indemnitee's own negligence, all involve explicit 
reference in the contract to an exception where an 
injury results from the sole negligence of the 
indemnitee.) 
Wollam, at 272 (brackets added). 
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It is impossible to read the indemnity provisions at issue in 
such a way to provide indemnification for ABP,s own negligence 
without allowing an interpretation that would also grant 
indemnification for ABP's sole negligence. There is no exception 
in the agreements for ABP's sole negligence, as there is no 
reference whatsoever to ABP's negligence. Therefore, ABP's broad 
interpretation of the indemnity provisions would be all-
encompassing and provide indemnification for both ABP's own 
negligence and ABP's sole negligence. It would even cover 
instances where ABP was the only party at fault. As a 
construction contract, this violates Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. The 
broad interpretation and rewriting of the provisions urged by ABP 
therefore make the provisions void and unenforceable. 
POINT VI 
THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS WERE NOT BARGAINED OR 
NEGOTIATED FOR AT ARM'S LENGTH AND THEREFORE MAY BE 
INVALIDATED AS VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
ABP has no contractual privity with JB. ABP attempts to 
utilize its contract with Clark and also claims third-party 
beneficiary status to the contract between Clark and JB in order 
to obtain indemnification for its own negligence. JB did not 
draft either agreement and the agreements must be construed 
against the drafter thereof. Furthermore, as is typical in the 
construction industry, equal bargaining does not exist in the 
preparation of the construction contracts. Subcontractors are 
simply required to enter into the contracts prepared by the owner 
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or general contractor. The ABP Agreement in this matter is the 
same contract that ABP used on all the projects at the WordPerfect 
site in Orem, Utah. (See depo of Stephen Clark, p. 53, Exhibit I; 
depo of Ken Erickson, pp. 115, 154, 155, Exhibit J.) It is seen, 
for example, in this case that the contract between ABP and Clark 
is on exactly the same form as the contract between ABP and Gene 
Peterson Concrete. (See contracts attached to Amended Cross-Claim 
of ABP Enterprises Against JB Sheet Metal, Inc., Clark Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc., and Amended Third-Party Complaint Against Gene 
Peterson, dba Gene Peterson Concrete, R. 1255-1212.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "an indemnity 
agreement may be invalidated as violative of public policy where 
shown to have resulted from duress, deception, a disparity of 
bargaining power, or negotiations conducted at less than arm/s 
length." Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. , 658 
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). It can hardly be 
argued that construction contracts such as those in this case were 
negotiated at arm's length with equal bargaining power. Any 
indemnity provision therein may therefore be invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no expression whatsoever in the contracts of an 
intent that JB should indemnify ABP for its own negligence. Such 
indemnification should not be implied and the provisions should 
not be rewritten to give them the legal effect now desired by ABP. 
The district court did not commit error in granting summary 
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judgment in favor of JB dismissing ABP's cross-claim for 
indemnification. The district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this J/^ day of March , 1994. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
rOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
attorneys for J.B. Sheet Metal, 
Inc. 
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A B P D E V E L O P M E N T C O M P A N Y 
CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 11th day of September, 1990, by and 
between ABP Enterprises, Inc., dba ABP Development Company, of Orem, Utah, hereinafter referred 
to as General Contractor, and CLARK MECHANICAL, of Provo, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
Sub-Contractor. 
A. SPECIAL TERMS: 
1. Job Description: #910, Building K. 
2. The Sub-Contractor shall perform for the General Contractor at or near 1359 N, Res. Way, 
Orem, Utah, the hereinafter described work, and under the conditions and terms contained herein. 
3. Work shall be commenced September 1,1990, diligently prosecuted, and completed by 
February 1, 1991. 
4. General Contractor shall pay Sub-Contractor, in accordance with statements prepared by the 
Sub-Contractor, a compensation of ($ 930,409.00), as specified under 2D (1) and (2). 
B. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK 
(a) Specifications and Standards: Sub-
Contractor shall perform the work in accordance with (1) Uic 
plans and specifications and exhibits, if any, for said job, and 
(2) according to ail standards prescribed by law or by anybody 
having the right to prescribe minimum standards. 
( b ) P e r m i t s : Unless otherwise provided herein, Sub-
Contractor shall, at Sub-Contractor's sole cost and expense, 
secure all necessary permits, make all cash or other deposits, 
furnish all bonds, and give all notices required by law. 
(c) Materials, Equipment, Labon Unless 
otherwise provided herein, Sub-Contractor shall furnish all 
material, utilities, supplies, tools, and equipment, and perform 
all labor. 
(d ) S a f e t y M e a s u r e s : Sub-Contractor shall take ail 
reasonable precautions to protect the work, workmen, and the 
public; and shall provide, where reasonably necessary, barriers, 
guards, temporary bridges, lights, and watchmen. 
( e ) Please see attached Exhibit "A" for specifications. 
2. COMPENSATION 
( a ) E x t r a Work: Sub-Contractor shall be entitled to 
payment for extra work performed only if such work shall 
have been previously authorized in writing by the General 
Contractor. 
(b ) T a x e s : The compensations provided herein includes 
and Sub-Contractor shall pay all State and Federal payroll 
taxes, including contributions or taxes assessed agninst 
employees on wages earned, in connection with the work. 
Sub-Contractor agrees lo indemnify General Contractor for alt 
Huhility in connections therewith and to make all reports 
required thereunder. The compensation also includes an 
amount on account of all other taxes now or hereafter 
imposed by any governmental authority upon, measured hy or 
incident lo, the performance of this contract or the purchase, 
storage, use or consumption by the Sub-Contractor of material 
used in the performance of this contract 
(c ) A c c e p t a n c e o f Work: Acccptincc shall be on the 
date the work is completed to the General Contractor's 
satisfactions. No payment hereunder shall constitute an 
acceptance of defective work or improper materials. 
(d) Terms of Payment: (l) At the end of each 
calendar month during the progress of the work, and upon 
completion of the entire work, Sub-Contractor shall be entitled 
to receive eighty-five percent (85%) of the compensation 
provided herein for the work performed during that month. 
The balance shall be payable 35 days after acceptance, provided 
there arc no undischarged or unsecured liens, attachments, or 
claims in connection with the work. General Contractor may 
require, as a condition to payment, that Sub-Contractor 
submit evidence, by receipted bills or otherwise, that all costs 
incurred for the work have been paid. (2) When payments arc 
due as provided above, Sub-Contractor shall prepare 
statements of amounts payable. Such statements shall show 
the total compensation for the work performed to date, less 
any previous payments. 
3. DELAYS 
The time for completion shall be extended for such period 
that the Sub-Contractor is delayed by acts of God or the 
elements, or by otlicr causes beyond Sub-Contractor's 
reasonable control, including civil disorders and labor 
disturbances. 
4.INSPECTIONAPPROVAL,CANCELLATION 
( a ) I n s p e c t i o n s : General Contractor shall have the 
right to visit and inspect the work, or any part thereof, at all 
times. Sub-Contractor shall keep a competent man in the 
immediate vicinity of the work to receive communications 
from General Contractor and to supervise the work. 
(b ) A p p r o v a l : General Contractor may reject 
materials, whether worked or unworked, and all portions of 
the work which appear to be unsound or defective or failing in 
any way to conform with the specifications hereof; Sub-
Contractor shall remove such rejected materials or portions of 
the work from the premises within twenty-four (21) hours 
after receiving notice thereof from General Contractor. If 
removal of rejected materials or work should result in damage 
to materials furnished by General Contractor, Sub-Contractor 
shall furnish new materials of identical kind and quantity 
without cost to General Contractor. 
( c ) C a n c e l l a t i o n : (1) Should Sub-Contractor fail, 
refuse, or neglect to supply sufficient material to be supplied 
by Sub-Contractor hereunder; or tools, labor, or properly 
skilled workmen to complete the work hereunder with 
reasonable diligence and dispatch, for three (3) days after 
written notice of such default to Sub-Contractor, the General 
Contractor may at any time thereafter take over and complete 
the work. The cost to the General Contractor of completing 
such work shall be deducted from any moneys due Sub-
Contractor. If such cost exceeds any such moneys, Sub-
Contractor shall reimburse the General Contractor. (2) 
Should the Sub-Contractor seek relief under any law for the 
benefit of insolvents, or be adjudged as bankrupt, the General 
Contractor may at any time thereafter terminate this 
agreement and complete the work as provided in Section 4(C)( 
1) hereof, except that any payments due from Sub-Contractor 
to vendors for material supplied for work hereunder may be 
made direct by the General Contractor to such vendors, and be 
deducted from the amounts otherwise due to the Sub-
Contractor. (3) General Contractor may, at his absolute 
discretion, stop the work at any time, but where Sub-
Contractor is not in default hereunder. General Contractor 
shall pay Sub-Contractor for all work done in conformity with 
the plans and specifications. 
5. LIABILITY 
(a ) G e n e r a l L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall 
indemnify and save General Contractor, its oCTicers or agents 
harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, injury, 
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, 
and all loss of or damage to property of others, resulting di-
rectly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this 
contract. 
(b) Liability for Existing Property: Sub-
Contractor shall be liable to General Contractor for any loss 
of or damage to existing property resulting directly or 
indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this contract 
to the extent of the applicable insurance which Sub-Contractor 
has in force at the time of the occurrence and which shall not 
be less than the amount provided in Section 6 hereof. 
(c) Liability for the Work Hereunder: Sub-
Contractor shall exercise due care and diligence in the conduct 
of the work hereunder and in the care and protection of any 
material or equipment furnished by General Contractor to 
Sub-Contractor therefor. Such work, material, or equipment 
lost or damaged by fire, storm, or any other cause whalsoevcr, 
Sub-Contractor shall reconstruct, repair or replace. 
(d) E m p l o y e r ' s L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall 
perform the work hereunder in conformance with all 
applicable Federal and State labor laws, and shall indemnify 
and save General Contractor harmless from any and all 
liability, claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature 
under such laws arising out of the performance of this 
contract 
( e ) L i e n s : Sub-Contractor shall discharge at once or 
shall bond against all liens which may be filed in connection 
with the work performed by Sub-Contractor, and shall save 
the General Contractor and the owners of the premises upon 
which the work is performed harmless therefrom. 
(f) A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s : Sub-Contntctor shall pay to 
General Contractor a reasonable attorney fee, in any legal 
action m which the General Contractor prevails, brought 
against Sub-Con tractor based on a breach of this contract. 
6. INSURANCE 
Sub-Contractor shall maintain at all times during the 
performance of work hereunder the following insurance in 
companies and on terms satisfactory to General Contractor 
(1) Workmen's Compensation Insurance, as prescribed or 
permitted by law. (2) Property Damage, Liability Insurance, 
indudingautomobile, covering property of others and property 
of General Contractor other than the work performed under 
this contract, in an amount not less that $1,000,000.00 for 
each occurrence. 
7. ASSIGNMENT 
( a ) A s s i g n m e n t : This agreement shall not be 
assigned, sublet, or transferred in whole or in part by the Sub-
Contractor, except with the previous written consent of the 
General Contractor. 
(b) Assignment by General Contractor, it 
is expressly agreed that General Contractor may assign all of 
its rights and interest hereunder to the owner, and that in 
such event, Sub-Contractor shall continue in its performance 
hereunder as if no assignment had been made. 
8- CONTRACTOR'S UNDERSTANDING 
It is understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor, as the 
result of careful examination, is satisfied as to the nature and 
location of the work, the conformation and structure of the 
ground, the character, quality, and quantity of the materials 
to be used, the character of equipment and facilities needed 
preliminary to and during the prosecution of the work, the 
general and local conditions, and all other matters which can 
in any way affect the work under this contract. No 
representations by or oral agreement with any officer, agent, 
or employee of the General Contractor, either before or aflcr 
the execution of this contract, shall affect or modify any of the 
Sub-Contractor's rights or obligations hereunder. 
It is further understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor 
is bound and will comply with all the terms and conditions of 
the labor agreements to which the General Contractor is a 
party, insofar as said labor agreements lawfully require the 
Sub-Contractor to be so bound. 
Df /7 Z^f—/79d 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR: 
ABP DEVELOPMENT GQJftPANY 
By: 
Dale: 'J*/"* f- /frd 
COI: .' - i i - / / { 
DEC o 51990 SUBCONTRACT AGRtfEMENT 
1 » S AGREEMENT rn.de at .Utah.tbi. d.y 
October _t,„90 b7Md,,,, „,-, „ ClarR Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 
. , ProVO/ Otah
 #kerelnafler referred to as tie Contractor,and—J'B< &*& 
Metals Inc. 
2487 South 3270 West West Valley City/ Utah 84119 
rereinaftcr referred to at t i t Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, oar tela, cecutors. administrators, auceessors. and assigE 
jointly and aewaBy firmly by tbese presents. 
ItTTKESSETH: Hut for and In consideration of tbe eoreaaats kereb contained, tbe Contractor and tie Subcontract© 
apre a* follow*: 
1. SCOPE OF WORK 
Tb*t the worx to be performed by the Subcontractor tmder tie term* of this agreement consists of t ie following: 
Fumisbinf of all labor and material, tools, implements, and «qnipnieni,acaffoldint.permiU,fees,«tc-,tbdoall of t ie 
following: Bldg. #9 Specs to apply/ 15000 General/ 15030 System commissioning/ 15042 
Testing/ 15043 Balancing/ (Including I.D. and O&M)/ 15050 Basic Materials and 
Methods/ 15180 Insulation (Ductwrap and breaching)/ 15800 Air distribution. 
Total price (Including tax addenda, and alternate}. . . . , $297/903.00 
TOien tie Subcontractor does sot Install all material f urnlsbed ander this Subcontract and materiil as Is »ot Installed 
fctobe delireredF.O.B Orem J o b s i t e 
O <r vv . . , . . . ,
 a .r .. , . Brower & Associates 
TVj k> strict accordance mih the plans and specifications as prepared by., 
<£-. *~ "T5 WordPerfect Bldg. #10 
V^v C/rciitSt and/or Enpneer. for the construction of 
ToT WordPerfect Corp. m __ Ofnaerf 
for which construction the Contractor bis tbe prime coatncl trith tbe Oiraer; together trill all addeada or authorised 
chin* es issued prior to tbe date of execution of this agreement. 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor tfree to be bound by the terms of ibe prime contact agreement, construction 
terulaiions, feneral conditions, plans and specifications, and any and all other contract documents. If any there bct Insofar 
as applicable to this subcontract tptmtnl, and to that portion of the worl herein described, to be performed by 1bt Subcon-
trielor. 
In the event of any doubt or question arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with ropect to the pUns 
and specification/ the it cision of the Architect and/or Engineer ahall be conduce and binding Should there be s o super-
tlibf architect orer thi worl. then the snatter In question shall be determined MI provided In Section 7 of the agreement. 
Tut Subcontractor shaD pt tte the work undertaken fa a prompt and « >*nncr whenever suck work. Or any 
part of it, becomes available, or u -ach other time or times as the Contractor may i C and so as to promote the general 
progress of the entire construction, and shall not, by delay or otherwise. Interfere with or hinder the work of the Contractor 
or any other Subcontractor, and In the event that the Subcontractor neglect* and/or falls to supply the necessary labor 
and/or materials, tools, Implements, equipment, e t c , in the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor ahall notify the 
Subcontractor In writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after date of such written notice, the 
Contractor shall have the right if he so desires to take over the work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the Subcon-
tractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at his option the Contractor may take 
over such portion of the Subcontractor's work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and 
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work. Whichever method the Contractor might elect 
to pursue, the Subcontractor agrees to release to the-Contractor, for his use only, without recourse, any materials, tools. 
Implements, equipment, e tc , on the site, belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the Con-
tractor, in completing the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best of 
bis ability and in the most economical manner available to him at the time, Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing 
any such portion of the work covered by this agreement shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the 
terms of this agreement, and i s the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall be 
insufficient to carer the costs accrued by the Contractor in completing the work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties, if 
any, ahall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference. 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partially 
npon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcon* 
tractors on the project, the Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same In 
writing to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent; and shall allow to the Contractor a reason-
able time In which to remedy such defects; and In the event he does not so report to the Contractor In writing, then It shall 
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully respon-
sible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work of 
others. 
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbkh and debris re-
sulting from his work. Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further^payment to Sub-
contractor until such time as, this condition Is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall dean up to the 
satisfaction of the inspectors, all dirt, grease marks, e t c , from walk, ceilings, floors, fixtures, e tc , deposited or placed thereon 
as a result of the execution of this subcontract. If the Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by 
the Contractor, the Contractor shall hare the right and power to proceed with the said flranfng, and the Subcontractor will 
on demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said tabor pins a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover super-
vision. Insurance, overhead, e t c 
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against 
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to 
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for 
herein, and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may 
sustain by reason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shaU not release the Subcontractor 
from his obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract. 
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or 
use any portion of the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final Inspection 
and acceptance thereof by the Owner, but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of 
said work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which 
may occur or develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, however, the Subcontractor 
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor, 
nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during such period of use. 
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completion and final acceptance of 
the Contract by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance and shall pay promptly for 
all materials and labor furnished to the project. In the event of loss or damage, he shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or 
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at his own expense, as directed by the Contractor. Subcon-
tractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor's work, 
property or materials. 
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying 
whenever a petition In Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him. 
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor .all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes 
toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and g^y/c them harmless from, 
any and all toss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys* fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions 
Or covenants of this contract. 
Subcontractor sgreet to fully comply with the Occupational Safety £ Health Act of 1970 and any and ill regulations 
issued pursuant thereto. Subcontractor as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless 
from any claims or charges of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fully comply with the act and regulations and 
agrees to reimburse the contractor for any fines, damages, or expense* of any kind incurred by the contractor by reason of 
the subcontractor's failure to comply. 
SURETY BONO 
;»•:v-i :K*.* i>•* .» .«• •»«>;< »*:« < 
4. PERMITS, LICENSES, FEES. TAXES. ETC. 
The Subcontractor shall, at his own cost and expense, apply for and obtain all necessary permits and licenses and ahall 
.conform strictly to the laws and ordinances in force In the locality where the work under the project is being done, insofar 
as applicable to work covered by this agreement. The Subcontractor shall hold harmless the prime Contractor against liability 
by rc&Miu of the Subcontractor baring (ailed to pay federal, atate, county or municipal taxes. 
6. INSURANCE 
The Subcontractor mgm* to provide and maintain workmen'* compensation insurance sod to comply In all reaped* 
with the employment and payment of labor, required by any constituted authority baring legal jurisdiction over the area in 
which the work k performed. 
The Subcontractor agrees to carry comprehensive public liability and ptopcxty damage insurance, and such other 
msurance'as the Contractor might deem necessary. In amounts aa approved by the Contractor. In order to protect the Con* 
tractor and Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, his agents, and/or employees* Such 
Insurance shall not be less than limits and coverages required In the general contract documents. 
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the 
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor. 
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained In fuD force and effect In a company or companies satisfactory 
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor's expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance 
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be 
notified by ten (10) days' written notice before cancellation of any such policy. In event of threatened cancellation for non-
payment of premium. Contractor may pay same for Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or sub-
•equently owing to Subcontractor hereunder. 
6. CHANGES. ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
The Contactor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by this agreement, and any changes made in 
the amount of work involved, or any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in 
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Sub-
contractor if such be possible; and if such mutual agreement is not possible, then the value of the work shall be determined as 
provided in Section 7 of this agreement. «Xn either event, however, the Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as 
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work, and pending any determi-
nation of the value thereof. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional work outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof 
ahall be conclusive with respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one 
week from date of completion. 
The Subcontractor shall not sublet, transfer or assign this agreement or any funds due Or to become due or any part 
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor. 
7. DISPUTES 
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute 
ahall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documents. If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute con-
cerning matters fa connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall be settled by 
a ruling of a board of arbitrstion consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and 
the third member shall be selected by the first two members. The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of 
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the 
arbitration in writing. 
The Contactor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings of any such boards of arbitration, finally and 
without recourse to any court of law. 
it 2V/,VQ3. 
in snonthJy payment* of ^ % of the work performed in any preceding month. In accordance with estimates 
prepared by the Subcontractor and as approved by the Contractor r-* ArchiteCt/Owner
 t ^ 
* auch payments to be made as payments are received by the Contractor from the Owner 
covering the monthly tsilmiUt of the Contractor, Including the approved portion of the Subcontractor's monthly estimate. 
In the event the Subcontractor does not submit to the Contractor such monthly estimates prior to the date of submit 
aion of the Contractor's monthly estimate, then the Contractor shall include in his monthly estimate to the Owner for work 
performed during the preceding month such amount as he aliaD deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the pre-
ceding month and the Subcontractor agrees to accept audi approved portion thereof as his regular monthly payment, as 
described above. 
The Subcontractor agrees to make good without cost to th* Owner or Contractor any and all defects due to faulty 
workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents; and if no such 
period be stipulated in the contract documents, then such guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion 
of the project. The Subcontractor further agrees to execute may special guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract 
documents, prior to final payment. 
In the event It appears to the Contractor that the labor, material and other bills incurred in the performance of the 
work are not being currently paid, the Contractor may take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that tue 
money paid with any progrtu payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor, material and all other bttls 
incurred in the performance of the work of Subcontractor. Tbe Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become 
due to the Subcontractor any sum or sums owing by the Subcontractor to the Contractor; and in the event of any breach by 
the Subcontractor of any provision or obligation of this Subcontract, or in the event of the assertion by other parties of any 
elnim or ftrn agntnsl I f f Contractor or Contractor*» Surety o r the premise* Arising out of the Subcontractor** performance o f 
this Contract, the Contractor shall have the right, but is not required, to retain out of any payments due or to become due to 
the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss, damage or expense there-
from, until the situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the satisfaction of the Contractor. These 
provisions thill be applicable even though the subcontractor has posted a full payment and performance bond. 
9. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT 
In the event the prime contract between the Owner end the Contractor should be terminated prior to its completion, 
then the Contractor and Subcontractor agree that an equitable eettlement for work performed under this agreement prior to 
*uch termination, will be made as provided by the contract documents, if such provision be made; or9 If nonesuch exist, sext 
by mutual agreement; or, failing either of these methods, by arbitration as provided in Section 7. 
10- EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
During the pcrfonnanee of this subcontract, the Subcontractor agrees to nol discriminate against any employee bccau.se 
of race, color, creed or national origin. As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order 
10925 of March 6,1961 as amended by Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965. The executive orders and the respec-
tive regulations are made a part of this subcontract by reference. 
11. TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS 
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract, the Subcontractor Is bound and 
•will comply with the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor is a party, insofar as said 
labor agreements lawfully require subcontractors tdlbe so bound. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms 
hereof by affixing their signatures hereunto. 
WTKESS: 
Clark Mechanical Contractors/ Inc* 
717 Colunibia Lane 
Prove Utah 84604 
J.B. Sheet Metal/ Inc, 
{Subcontractor) 
2487 south 3270 West • - 7. .,/g/9.. /?
 f ,.,. .4~ . 
(AddrcuJ { ' 
West Valley City/ Utah 84119 
Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 
Shis statement i s attached and made a part of the ClarX Mechanical Cont-
ractors/, Inc. Subcontract Agreement: 
(32) The federally assisted construction contractor certifies that he does 
not maintain or provide for his employees any segregated fac i l i t i e s at any 
of his establishments, and that he does not permit his employees t o perform 
their services at any location. under his control
 f where segregated f a c i l i t i e s 
are maintained. The federally assisted construction contractor c e r t i f i e s 
further that he v i l l cot maintain or provide for his employees any segregated 
faci l i t ies at any of his establishments, end that he v i l l not permit h i s 
_ , i „ ii luifiii t i i i i antiifia ir nnir lnriitrin tinrtrr Irts wntrrti Y¥** 
segregated "facilities are oaintaincd. The federally assisted construction 
contractor agrees that a breach of this certification i s a violation of the 
Equal Opportunity clause in this contract. As used in this cert i f icat ion f 
the term "segregated facilities*1 means any waiting rooms, vork areas, re s t 
rooms and vash rooms, restaurants and other eating areas, time docks , locker 
rooms and other storage or dressing areas, parking lots , drinking fountains, 
recreation or entertainment areas, transportation, and-housing f a c i l i t i e s pro-
vided for employees vhich are segregated by explicit directive or are 'in fac t 
segregated on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, because of 
habit, local custom, or other reason. The federally assisted construction 
contractor agrees that (except vhere he has obtained identical cert i f icat ions 
froa proposed contractors for specific time periods) he-vill obtain ident ica l 
certifications from proposed subcontractors prior to the award of subcontracts 
exceeding $10,000 vhich are not exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportunit 
clause, and that he v i l l retain such certifications in his f i l e s . 
Date 
Stephen P« Clark President 
Name and Title of Signer (Please type) 
H3TE: 3he penalty for making false statements in offers i s prescribed 
in 18 U. S. C- 1001 
xnjoci. 
S U B C O N T R A C T C L S E 
To be added to Parag. 10 "Equal Employment Opportunity* 
Clark Meciianical Contractors/, Inc. is a non-exempt federal contractor 
and is subject to the following regulations: 41 <SR 60-1-4 (a) (7)* 
41 CER 60-250*4 (m),( and 41 CER 60-741.4(f)* 
Statement of Certification on Nbnsegregated Facilities (See Attachment*) 
Also a part of this subcontract* 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FEB 11 l\ ? s / $ ' C K ; 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI 
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON dba GENE 
PETERSON CONCRETE 
Third-Party 
Defendant 
The Court has received and fully considered the following motions now pending in 
this case: 
1. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
1720 
Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical Contractors Inc. 
2 Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement. 
3. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal. 
4. J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement. 
5. A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement Against Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing. 
The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above and accordingly grants 
Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of indemnity. Based upon its interpretation of 
the relevant terms of the contract between A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the 
indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause 
clearly makes reference to liability that may arise from the subcontractor's performance. 
Their is no similar reference to possible liability arising from the contractor's actions. 
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above on similar 
grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, no contractual privity 
exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between Clark and J. B. Sheet 
Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event. 
With regard to the fourth and fifth motions enumerated above, the Court grants the 
motions in part and denies them in part. Consistent with the Court' s prior ruling on Clark's 
motion for summary judgement, the court rules that plaintiffs "Fifth Cause of Action" is 
invalid to the extent that it is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract 
between A.B.P. Enterprises and Clark Mechanical or the contract between Clark Mechanical 
and J.B. Sheet Metal. Based upon its interpretation of the contracts, the Court rules as a 
matter of law that plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary of such contracts. See 
1719 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981); and Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). Although the contracts provide generally 
for the implementation of safety measures, the terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the plaintiff in this case. 
Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the parties' contractual obligations of safety would 
clearly have been incidental. 
The Court further grants defendants' motions for summary judgement against plaintiff 
to the extent that plaintiff may be attempting to assert his second and third claims (involving 
alleged OSHA violations) as independent causes of action. The Court must agree with 
defendants that no independent action exists for the breach of OSHA standards. 
However, the Court denies the fourth and fifth motion enumerated above to the extent 
that defendant's seek to have plaintiffs second and third claims dismissed. In order to 
avoid procedural or formal difficulties that may arise, the Court will not dismiss plaintiffs 
second and third causes of action. The Court notes that while OSHA violations may not be 
the basis for an independent cause of action, evidence of such violations may be permitted as 
evidence of negligence (i.e. evidence of the relevant standard of care and the possible breach 
thereof). Accordingly, plaintiff's second and third causes are not to be regarded as alternate 
causes of action but rather alternate bases upon which negligence may be found. 
The Court is inclined to grant defendants' motions for summary judgement with 
regard to plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action on the basis that the facts involved in this case 
doe not appear to be legally sufficient to support plaintiffs claim of an "inherently dangerous 
condition." However, the Court will reserve its ruling on this issue until all the evidence has 
been introduced at trial. 
1718 
Finally, finding no need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed of 
in its prior ruling in this case, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, filed 
January 22, 1993. 
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Edward P. Moriarity, Esq. 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
John N. Braithwaite, Esq. 
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Robert R. Wallace, #3366 
John N. Braithwaite, #4544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County State of Utah 
CARMA B ^ I M ffi? 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and A.B.P. 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, dba ABP 
Development Company, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The following motions have been received and have been 
submitted for decision by the Court in this action: 
1. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc•; 
2. Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgement; 
3. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal; 
4. J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment; 
5. A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff; and 
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing. 
The Court, having reviewed each of the foregoing 
motions, the memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition 
thereto by the parties, having reviewed the relevant law, being 
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS that A.B.P. Enterprises' ("A.B.P.") Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") is denied, and Clark's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P.'s claim for indemnity 
is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity provisions of the 
contract between A.B.P. and Clark make reference to liability that 
may arise from Clark's performance of the contract, but cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal is 
denied. There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. 
Sheet Metalf and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of 
the contract between Clark and J.B. Sheet Metal. The Court 
further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that J.B. 
Sheet Metal indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiff are granted in part and denied in part 
as follows: 
1. Consistent with the Court's prior ruling on 
Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment is granted 
in favor of J.B. Sheet Metal and A.B.P. and against plaintiff on 
plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action. The Court rules that 
plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is invalid to the extent that it 
is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract 
between A.B.P. and Clark or the contract between Clark and J.B. 
Sheet Metal. The plaintiff was not an intended third-party 
beneficiary of either of the contracts. Although the contracts 
provide generally for the implementation of safety measures, the 
terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the 
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plaintiff. Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the 
contractual obligations of the parties would clearly have been 
incidental. 
2. The Court further grants summary judgment in favor 
of all the defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's Second 
and Third Causes of Action to the extent that the plaintiff 
alleges the Second and Third Causes of Action as independent 
causes of action• The Court finds that no independent action 
exists for the breach of OSHA standards. Evidence of OSHA 
violations may not be the basis of an independent cause of action, 
but may be permitted only as evidence of negligence. However, the 
Court does not dismiss plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of 
Action. They are not alternate causes of action, but rather 
alternate bases upon which negligence may be found. 
3. With regard to all the motions for summary judgment 
on plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, the Court finds that the 
facts involved in this action do not appear to be legally 
sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of an inherently dangerous 
condition. However, the Court reserves its ruling on this issue 
until all of the evidence has been introduced at trial. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for 
Rehearing, filed January 22, 1993, is denied. The Court finds no 
need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed 
of in its prior ruling. 
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DATED this 7 day of / y > ^ M . , 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for A.B.P. 
Enterprises 
iL-i L 7 (L^ys-crcny 
GLENN C. HANNff 
Attorney for Clark 
Mechanical 
JLE RAY M. HARDINC-J ^ 
District Court: *jtadge^ ( -; 
LYNN C. HARRIS 
Attorney for plaintiff 
Richard HeaJ 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Gene 
Peterson Concrete 
nfa* 
tOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorney for J.B. 
Sheet Metal 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI 
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON dba GENE 
PETERSON CONCRETE 
Third-Party 
Defendant 
The Court has received and fully considered J.B. Sheet Metal's Cross-Motion for 
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Summary Judgement on A.B.P's Cross-Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, together with both 
supporting and opposing memoranda. In its February 10, 1993 memorandum decision, the 
court ruled as follows: 
The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above [A.B.P. Enterprise's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical 
Contractors Inc.] and accordingly grants Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of 
indemnity. Based upon its interpretation of the relevant terms of the contract between 
A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s 
own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause clearly makes reference to liability that 
may arise from the subcontractor's performance. Their is no similar reference to possible 
liability arising from the contractor's actions. 
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above [A.B.P. 
Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. 
Sheet Metal.] on similar grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, 
no contractual privity exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to 
establish that it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between 
Clark and J. B. Sheet Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event. 
Upon finding no evidence of contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet 
Metal, and upon denying A.B.P.'s "Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of 
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal," the Court has already implicitly ruled on all issues 
necessary to the disposition of J.B. Sheet Metal's pending motion. Accordingly, the Court 
hereby grants the motion, finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 
A.B.P.'s cross-claim for indemnity against J.B. Sheet Metal and that J.B. Sheet Metal is 
entitled to judgement on the issue as a matter of law. 
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this j?/xfrdav of June, 1993. 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Edward P. Mortality, Esq. 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq. 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
John N. Braithwaite, Esq. 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.Co 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs< 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and A.B.P. 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, dba ABP 
Development Company, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs< 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The court, having reviewed and fully considered J.B. 
Sheet Metal, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P. 
Enterprises' Cross-Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., together 
with both supporting and opposing memoranda, and having previously 
ruled on these issues as raised by A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet 
Metal, being fully advised din the premises, and finding good cause 
therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that J.B. Sheet 
Metal, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P. 's Cross-
Claim Against J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. is granted. There is no 
contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc., and 
A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an intended third-party 
beneficiary of the indemnity provisions of the contract between 
Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. The 
Court further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties 
that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own 
negligence. 
DATED this /l3 day o £ ^ 2 ^ S 1993. 
fiO^RABLER&Y M / HARPING/ ~ 
Fpusth District Couirh, Judge 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 910400292 PI 
DATE: October 4 , 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling on Clark Mechanical's motion for 
Judgement on Its Cross-Claim against J.B. Sheet Metal, and J.B. Sheet Metal's Cross Motion 
for Summary Judgement on Clark Mechanical's Cross-Claim for Indemnity. Having 
received and considered both motions, together with memoranda both in support and in 
opposition to the motion, the Court hereby enters judgement and grants J.B. Sheet Metal's 
Motion for Summary Judgement. As indicated in earlier memoranda, the Court finds that 
the contractual language does not require J.B. Sheet Metal to indemnify Clark Mechanical or 
A.B.P. Enterprise for A.B.P.'s own negligence. 
Counsel for J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
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Dated this 4th day of October, 1993. 
HARDING, JUDGI 
ex: Brent D.Young, Esq. 
Lynn C. Harris, Esq. * \ 
Raymond M. Berry, Esq? 
Mark Dalton Dunn, Esq 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Robert R. Wallace, Esq. 
Paul S. Felt, Esq. 
^ 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and A.B.P. 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, dba ABP 
Development Company, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene 
Peterson Concrete, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910400292PI 
Judge Harding 
The court, having reviewed and fully considered Clark 
Mechanical's motion for judgment on its cross-claim against J.B. 
Sheet Metal, and J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.'s cross motion for summary w i O J 
judgment on Clark Mechanical's cross-claim against J.B. Sheet 
Metal,Inc., together with both supporting and opposing memoranda, 
and having previously ruled on these issues as raised by A.B.P. 
Enterprise's motion for partial summary judgment on issues of 
indemnity against Clark Mechanical and J.B. Sheet Metal, being 
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. That J.B. Sheet Metal Inc.'s cross motion for 
summary judgment on Clark Mechanical's cross-claim against J.B. 
Sheet Metal, Inc. is granted. The Court finds that the indemnity 
provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any 
intent of the parties that J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. indemnify Clark 
Mechanical for Clark Mechanical's own negligence or for A.B.P. 
Enterprise's own negligence. Clark Mechanical's cross-claim 
against J.B. Sheet Metal is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Clark Mechanical's motion for summary judgment 
against J.B. Sheet Metal is hereby denied. 
DATED this /fi day of / ^ g ^ 1993. 
V 
\ 
\ 
,E RATM. HARDING 
D i s t r i c t Court Ji 
+Zt44*j 
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Approved as to form: 
STRONG & HANNI 
Glenn C. Hanni (I 
H. Burt Ringwood ^ 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
V. ^ W X ^ 
robert Wallace 
John N. Braithwaite 
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ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation, dba ABP ) 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; and ) 
CLARK MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, ) 
INC., ) 
Defendants. ) 
Deposition of STEPHEN CLARK, taken pursuant to 
Notice at the instance and request of the Plaintiff, at the 
offices of Strong & Hanni, 6th floor Boston Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on Thursday, the 4th day of June, 1992, at 
9:20 a.m., before Vicky McDaniel, a Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
Utah License No. 285. 
* * * 
Associated Professional Reporters 
10 West Broadway / Suite 200 / Sail Lake City, Utah 84101 
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A Uh-huh. 
Q You signed it? 
A Yes. 
Q And as I understand it, this is a contract that— 
a similar contract that has been used on the different 
buildings out at the WordPerfect site? 
A As far as we're concerned, yes. 
Q Is it any different than the other ones that you 
remember signing, in form? 
A This contract is the same contract that we've 
entered into with ABP on all the projects. 
Q Six years? 
A Yes. 
Q For, I can't remember how many, ten or plus 
buildings? 
A As far as I recall. 
Q Down under performance of the work under d, do 
you see that under safety measures? 
A Okay, yes. 
Q It says—and under this contract you are deemed a 
subcontractor, yes? 
A Right. 
Q Up at the top, ABP is the contractor? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Says, "Subcontractor shall take all reasonable 
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Q Next on page 44 and 45, what I received, this 
apparently was just a blank of the standard ABP Development 
Company contract? 
A Yes. 
Q Apparently this is on a computer, you just bring it 
up and fill in the blanks? 
A I don't do that. 
Q Is that legal who does that? 
A Pardon? 
Q Does legal do that or one of your assistants? 
A One of the girls in the office that does the 
contracts up. 
Q Let's next go to page 46. It says "Meeting 8-8-90, 
Consultation, Dale Stevenson, OSHA - Safety." 
Was this where you invited them out? It's hard to 
see what that little diagram is. 
A Yes. It's where we invited them out and where they 
broke that down into what OSHA does now, they do consultation, 
they do inspection and they do training. That's what the 
diagram in the corner was. That's the notes I took. 
Q These are your notes? 
A From that meeting, yes. 
Q Are these issues that you remember you wanted to 
talk with him about or just issues that he brought up? 
A We asked him to do the meeting and those were the 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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A Do we do part of his work for him? 
Q Right. 
A No. 
Q All you do is see that it is done correctly? 
A The foreman on the job does, yes, and helps him with 
scheduling and things like that. 
Q Is the contract that is signed, particularly this 
one for Building 10 between ABP and Gene Peterson, is that the 
entire agreement between the two parties? 
A Do you consider when he signs his mechanic's lien 
releases, is that part of the contract? Do you contract that 
because there is that document that when he receives his check 
he signs. 
Q That releases you of the liens? 
A The liens and stuff like that. 
Q But there's nothing else, there's not oral 
agreements, there aren't any other written agreements 
somewhere else that I may not know of that would come into 
play? 
A I don't know of any. 
Q Do you know who created this? Was this created by 
ABP, this contract? 
A I don't know exactly. It's been basically, with 
some revisions, the same contract when Horman Construction was 
doing work for — 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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Q But it was not something that would have been 
created by any of the subcontractors? 
A Not that I know of, no. 
Q Was there ever a time during the work performed on 
Building 10 that Gene Peterson Concrete did not have its 
insurance in such a manner that it was acceptable to ABP? 
A Not that I know of. At that time I wouldn't have 
probably been told unless there was something serious about 
it, because I didn't handle that part of it at that time. 
Q Has anybody told you that that was the situation? 
A No, not that I can recollect. 
Q Under the contract, who is the employer? You may 
want to look at Section 5, subsection (d), it says "Employer's 
liability." That's the only place I can find where an 
employer is even referenced here. I don't know who an 
employer in this contract would be. 
MR. BERRY: He's asking you for a legal opinion. If 
you don't know the answer to it, tell him no, you have no 
opinion. 
THE WITNESS: I really don't know that. It 
specifies subcontractor and general contractor on down, but I 
don't know. 
Q (BY MR. DUNN) Where the contract talks about the 
subcontractor's performance of this contract, would that go 
into anything that ABP was required to do? 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
